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ABSTRACT
We analyze the effect of mergers on various aspects of airline
performance during the period 1970-84, using a panel data set
constructed by Caves et al. Estimates derived from a- simple
"matched pairs" statistical model indicate that these mergers were
associated with reductions in unit cost. The average annual rate
of unit cost growth of carriers undergoing merger was 1.1
percentage points lower, during the five-year period centered on
the merger, than that of carriers not involved in merger. Almost
all of this cost reduction appears to have been passed on to
consumers. Part of the cost reduction is attributable to merger-
related declines in the prices of inputs, particularly labor, but
about two-thirds of it is due to increased total factor
productivity. One source of the productivity improvement is an
increase in capacity utilization (load factor).
Frank R. Lichtenberg Moshe Kim
Jerome Levy Economics Institute Dept. of Economics
Bard College, Blithewood University of Haifa
Annandale-On-Hudson, NY 12504
(914) 758-7448I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of previous papers, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987,
1989a, 1989b) analyzed the effect of ownership change on
productivity and related variables (i.e., output and inputs) among
U.S. manufacturing establishments using the Census Bureau's
Longitudinal Research Database. They found that the least
efficient plants in an industry are most likely to experience an
ownership change in the future: that ownership change tends to be
followed by above-average improvements in productivity; that
reductions in administrative overhead are an important source of
these productivity improvements: and that the productivity gains
associated with management buyouts are much larger than those
associated with ttgarden-varietyVV  changes in ownership.
The purpose of this paper is to extend this line of research
on the consequences of control changes for economic performance by
analyzing the effects of mergers on prices, costs, productivity,
and capacity utilization in the U.S. air transportation industry
during the period 1970-1984. The rate of merger and takeover
activity in this industry increased sharply in about 1979: there
was apparently only one significant merger involving U.S. airlines
during the years 1970-78, but four mergers during 1979-81.
Although this increase may partly reflect an acceleration in merger
and takeover activity throughout the economy at around this time,
it is probably largely attributable to the deregulation of the
industry that occurred in the late 1970s. In any case, these and
subsequent developments have stimulated an intense debate about the
effects and desirability of airline mergers.In a recent paper, Morrison and
effect of airline mergers (excluding
2
Winston (1989) evaluated the
the Texas Air acquisitions)
during 1986-7 on travelers' welfare, accounting for both price and
non-price effects, using an empirical model of air travelers'
preferences. They noted that in principle, although mergers may
reduce consumer welfare by reducing competition and thus increasing
fares, this loss may be offset by a number of traveler benefits
that mergers may provide. These include reducing transfer time by
eliminating connections that require changing airlines, and
providing a larger network and consolidated frequent flier mileage.
They concluded from their empirical analysis that these mergers had
mixed effects on travelers' welfare: half reduced it, and (provided
that untaxed frequent flier mileage continues to be provided) half
improved it. In the aggregate, though, the mergers had a modest
positive impact on travelers' welfare: the welfare gain from
increased frequent flier mileage and cities served slightly
exceeded the welfare loss from increased fares.' Morrison and
Winston provided evidence concerning the effects of recent mergers
on travelers' welfare, but they acknowledged




' Morrison and Winston observe that their failure to account
for changes in choice probabilities and for mode or destination
shifts in response to mergers causes them to underestimate the net
benefits of mergers. On the other hand, they argue that "mergers
have largely foreclosed any opportunity to integrate the air
transportation system more effectively, thus undermining
deregulation's long-run performance" (1989, p. 69). This effect,
since unmeasured, would cause net benefits to be overstated.3
In the next section we describe the database for our analysis,
and its limitations. The econometric methodology for determining
the effects of mergers on airline performance is outlined in
Section III. Empirical results are presented and interpreted in
Section IV, and conclusions are reported in Section V.
II. DATA
The database for this investigation was developed by Caves,
Christensen, Tretheway, and Windle and has been analyzed and
described by them in a number of earlier papers (1981, 1984, 1987).
It includes annual observations on 25 U.S. trunk and local service
airlines for 1970-84, and on 10 (start-up) airlines for 1982-84.
The underlying source of the data is the Civil Aeronautics Board's
Form 41 report filed annually by each air carrier.
For each observation the database reports the value and
quantity of output and of five inputs2: labor, fuel, flight
equipment, ground property and equipment, and all other inputs
(labelled llmaterialsll). Output and some of the inputs are actually
multilateral indices of a number of components. Output is a
multilateral index of revenue passenger-miles (RPM) of scheduled
service, RPM of charter service, revenue ton-miles (RTM) of mail,
and RTM of all other freight. Because, as Morrison and Winston
(1989) have shown, travelers value attributes such as travel and
transfer time and schedule delay, this producer output index is a
2 The value of output is total revenue, and the value of each
input is its cost.very imperfect index of true input in travelers' utility functions.
However errors in measuring the "qualityfi@ of output pose a problem
for determining the effects of mergers only to the extent that
changes in these errors are correlated with mergers. Morrison and
Winston found that frequent flier mileage was the only component
of output quality significantly affected by merger. But apparently
frequent-flier miles flown by passengers are generally included in
the RPM data reported by airlines.3 Therefore our output quantity
and price indexes capture, or "adjust for", this aspect of output
quality. Also, frequent-flier programs were much less important
during our sample period than they were in the more recent period
examined by Morrison and Winston.
4
Labor is an index of 15 categories of employees, flight
equipment is an index of nine aircraft categories, and materials
is an index of 7 categories of materials input. The output and
input quantity indices are all normalized so that their values
equal 1.0 for Delta Airlines in 1977.
In addition to these variables, the database includes three
characteristics of airline operations: the number of points served,
load factor (the ratio of seat miles sold to seat miles actually
3 Although carriers are not specifically instructed or
required to include frequent-flier miles in RPM in their financial
reports, they generally do so, according to Clay Moritz,
Supervisory Systems Accountant in the Department of
Transportation's Office of Aviation Information Management
(telephone conversation with author, 11/15/89). The issue of
accounting for frequent-flier awards has been considered during the
last few years by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and by the Air Transport Association.5
flown), and average stage length (the average distance between
takeoffs and landings). Caves et al (1984) have demonstrated that
these characteristics are important determinants of the cost of
providing airline services. We calculated the number of seat miles
flown (FLOWN) by dividing the output index by the load factor.
Our objective is to compare the performance of carriers
involved in a merger with that of other carriers in the years both
before and after the merger occurred, and to calculate the
difference between the before and after comparisons. The following
five mergers occurred during our sample period:
YEAR MERGER
1972 Northeast merged with Delta
1979 North Central and Southern merged to form Republic
1980 National merged with Pan American
1980 Air West merged with Republic
1981 Texas International merged with Continental
A key feature of our approach is to add tosether the values and
quantities of output and inputs of two airlines for the years prior
to their merqer. This will enable us to contrast the relative
efficiency of a given bundle of resources under divided ownership
and control to its relative efficiency under common ownership. The
unit cost or total factor productivity (TFP) of the pre-merger firm
aggregates are essentially weighted averages of the unit costs or
TFP of the two component carriers, with weights proportional to the
relative sizes (total costs) of the latter.
After adding up the value and quantity data for pre-merger6
observations, we calculated for all observations a number of
additional variables. We calculated the implicit price of output
(PQ) and of the five inputs (P,, . . ..Pg) by computing the ratio of
its value to its quantity. We calculated the cost share of each
of the five inputs (S,, . . ..Ss) by calculating the ratio of its value
to the sum of the values of all inputs. We constructed Divisia-
type indices of the quantity and price of total input, as follows:
QI = exp( Ci (Si * In Qi))
\
PI = exp( Ci (Si * In Pi))
where QI and PI are the quantity and price, respectively, of total
input and Qi is the quantity of input i (i = 1,...,5). We then
constructed an index of total-factor productivity, TFP, by
computing the ratio of output quantity Q to input quantity QI.
Load factor (LOAD) was defined as the ratio of Q to FLOWN; for the
pre-merger observations, LOAD is equivalent to a weighted average
of the load factors of the 2 airlines, with weights based on their
respective values of "potential outputtt FLOWN. Average stage
length (LENGTH) for these observations was defined as a weighted
average of the stage lengths of the two airlines, with weights
based on their respective values of "actual output" Q.
Unfortunately, although the database constructed by Caves &
a contains 420 observations, due to the absence of significant
data and to the occurrence of strikes (of greater than 25 days),
they consider only 272 (65 percent) of the observations to be
reliable and meaningful. We eliminated from the sample the 148
observations identified by them as having bad data. Some of theseobservations were of airlines about to merge with other airlines.
Therefore some of the pre-merger observations in our merger-
7
aggregated data set represent only one of the 2 carriers that
merged. Including these observations in the sample precludes
obtaining meaningful estimates of the effect of mergers on the
levels of values and quantities, such as total cost and output
quantity. However assuming the data are randomly missing we can
still obtain unbiased
of variables such as
cost, TFP, and LOAD.
improved by giving
estimates of the effects of mergers onratios
prices (ratios of value to quantity),' unit
The efficiency of our estimates might be
less weight to VVincompletelV pre-merger






to measure the effect of mergers on a set of
airline performance
particular variable
variables. To determine the
X we will estimate an equation
In Xjt = v + 6, + C,=14 P, Mjt_r + CS,j4 e, Mjt+s + Ejt (1)
where Xjt is the value of the variable for airline j in year t; a
is the intercept; 6, is a "fixed effect" for year t; Mjt_, is a dummy
variable equal to one if airline j merged in year t-r (r=l,...,4),
4 When incomplete pre-merger observations were eliminated from
the sample, the estimation results were qualitatively similar but
weaker than when they were included.8
and otherwise equal to zero: Mjt+S is similarly defined; and E is a
disturbance term. (We will also generalize the model by replacing
the intercept a with a set of airline fixed effects rj.) The
coefficient p, measures the logarithmic difference in the mean
values of X in t-r between airlines that did and did not merge in
year t. Although we will allow for separate coefficients for each
of the four years before and after merger, due to the fairly small
sample (N=243) and the relative infrequency of mergers, we-do.not
expect to be able to obtain very precise estimates of the
individual p and CY parameters. We will focus instead on the
average values of the "before" and llafterlV coefficients, and on the
difference between the two:
P = (P, + P2 + P3 + P4)/4
(1 = (CY, + "2 + (r3 + cYJ/4
r=CY-_P
The parameter p indicates how the merger or lltreatmentVl  group
compared with the non-merger or l~controlB~ group in the four years
prior to merger, and CY indicates how they compared in the four
post-merger years. To obtain consistent and efficient estimates
of the effect of the merger treatment, we will include airline
effects rj. In the presence of such airline effects, the estimates
of P, e, and r are based entirely on the within-airline sample
moments. Including the ~~ is equivalent to using a "matched pairs"
experimental design, which as Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1972, 172-
3) note is desirable on efficiency grounds.
Of the variables we shall examine, the one most closely9
related to consumer welfare is the implicit price of airline
services PQ, defined as the ratio of total revenue (TR) to the
output quantity index (Q):
PQ = TR/Q
PQ can also be represented as the product of the price-cost margin
(MARGIN) --the ratio of TR to total cost (TC)--and of unit cost UC,
the ratio of TC to Q:
PQ = (TR/TC) * (TC/Q) = MARGIN * UC
\
\
The growth rate of the output price is therefore the sum of the
growth rates of the price-cost margin and of unit cost:
pq = margin + uc
where lower case symbols denote growth rates of the corresponding
variables. The effect of mergers on the output price, measured by
the parameter I? based on eq. (1) with X defined as PQ, is therefore
the sum of the effects of mergers on MARGIN and UC. One might
conjecture that mergers increase firms' market power, thus raising
MARGIN, but that they also reduce unit costs. In this case the
effect of mergers on output price is indeterminate, a priori, and
must be determined empirically.
There are two distinct ways --one external, the other internal,
to the firms involved-- in which mergers could affect, and might be
expected to reduce, unit costs. The first is by influencing the
prices paid by the producer for inputs. There may be economies of
scale in the supply of some of the firm's inputs. Also, the firm's
monopsony power (as well as its monopoly power) may be increased
by merger, thus lowering the prices of factors of production.Second, merger may increase total-factor productivity, the
technical efficiency with which resources are deployed. As noted
above, Caves et al have documented that two features of airline
network operations--the load factor and average stage length--
affect output per unit of total input. Merging two airline
networks might constitute a means to increase the rate of capacity
utilization (load factor), and more generally, to reconfigure
operations in a more efficient manner. Figure 1 summarizes the
\
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potential channels we shall investigate via which mergers'may
affect the price of airline services.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Estimates of the parameters p, a, and F corresponding to
different definitions of the variable X are presented in Table 1.
We report l'total" estimates (excluding fixed firm effects) of p and
Q, and both total and l'withinl' estimates (including firm effects)
of r. The estimates on the first line of the table indicate that
the mean output price of airlines involved in mergers was 6.0
percent higher than that of airlines not involved in mergers in the
4 years prior to merger, and 5.1 percent lower in the 4 years after
merger. The pre- to post-merger change in the merger vs. non-
merger difference is therefore -11 percent. The total estimates
suggest that merger is associated with a movement from above-
average to below-average output price, but none of the parameters
are significantly different from zero at conventional levels of11
significance. However when we include fixed firm effects in the
model, thereby utilizing a "matched pairs" design, the estimate of
P is significant at the 5 percent level, despite the fact that the
point estimate declines by more than half. The increase in the
price of output of airlines involved in merger is 5 percentage
points lower, from before to after the merger, than the
corresponding increase of non-merger airlines during the same
calendar period. The pre- and post-merger periods are centered two
and a half years before and after the merger, so this is equivalent
to about a one percentage point lower average annual rate of
growth. Since the provision of frequent-flier miles is
incorporated in our output price index, this result is consistent
with Morrison and Winston's finding that mergers increase
travelers' welfare, when frequent-flier mileage is accounted for.
As discussed above, in principle a change in the relative
price of output could be due to a change in the price-cost margin,
a change in unit costs, or both. The second line of the table
indicates that merger is associated with a very small increase in
MARGIN, from slightly below-average to slightly above-average, but
the change in MARGIN is far from significant in both the total and
within models. The reduction in the relative price of output is
more than completely "explained It by the reduction in unit costs.
Airlines involved in merger had 6.1 percent higher unit costs prior
to merger, and 5.4 percent lower unit costs post-merger, than non-
merger airlines in the same calendar year. As in the case of PQ,
the total estimates of the parameters p, cy, and P are not very12
significant (although highly suggestive), but the within estimate
of P is significant. It implies that the average annual rate of
unit cost growth of carriers undergoing merger is about 1.1
percentage points lower,
the merger, than that of
We now proceed to a
unit costs into its two
effect on input prices.
during the five-year period centered on
carriers not involved in merger.
decomposition of the effect of merger on
components, the effect on TFP and the
Parameter estimates for the dependent
variable In TFP are reported in line 4 of the table. The estimates
closely parallel, with an opposite sign, those for PQ and UC:
airlines involved in mergers had below-average productivity before,
and above-average productivity after, the merger. The findings
that p < 0 and that P > 0 are very consistent with Lichtenberg and
Siegel's (1987) results concerning productivity and changes in
ownership of manufacturing plants. They found that plants changing
owners had below-average levels of TFP prior to changing owners,
and above-average TFP growth rates subsequent to the ownership
change. Their estimates of the difference in TFP growth rates were
highly statistically significant, whereas our within estimate of
P is significant at only about the 9 percent level, using a  one-
tailed test. However their estimates were based on a panel of
about 20,000 manufacturing establishments, while our sample
includes only about 30 airlines. Our point estimate of I? (.040)
is much larger than (about 8 times) their point estimate of the
effect of ownership change on manufacturing plant productivity.
It is very similar, however, to Lichtenberg and Siegel's (1989b)estimates of the effects of leveraged buyouts




manufacturing establishments: .028 and .039, respectively.
The lion's share of merger-related unit cost reductions thus
appear to be due to increased productivity. How are these
productivity improvements achieved? Two determinants of an
airline's TFP are its load factor and average stage length. Lines
\
5 and 6 of the table examine the effect of mergers on these two
variables. Carriers involved in mergers had significantly below-
average load factors prior to merging; post-merger, their load
factors were no longer below average. The within estimate of the
change in LOAD is 4.1 percent, and is significant. Thus an
increase in the rate of capacity utilization is one source of the
productivity improvement associated with mergers.
The estimates of the effect of merger on average stage length
are more ambiguous. The total estimates suggest that merger is
associated with a 20 percent increase in stage length, from average
to above-average values of LENGTH, implying that increased stage
length is another source of productivity gain. The within estimate
implies that stage length declines slightly in connection with
mergers. Neither the total nor the within estimates are
significant, however.
As we argued in the previous section, declines in unit cost
may result from input price reductions as well as from productivity
increases. Input prices are the last set of variables whose co-
movements with merger events we analyze. The last five lines of14
Table 1 display the estimates of /3, CY, and r for the five input
prices, listed in descending order of the mean cost shares of the
inputs.5 As in the case of the stage length estimates, the total
estimate of r for the price of labor is positive, whereas the
within estimate is negative. But in this case the within estimate
(which we have argued is more reliable than the total estimate) is
significantly different from zero. It implies that the increase
in the average price of labor paid by airlines involved in:mergers
during the five-year period around the merger date was 4.6
percentage points lower than the increase paid by other airlines
during the same period. Because the labor measure is an index of
15 categories of employees, two different factors may be
contributing to the lower average wage growth of merger-involved
airlines. First, mergers may be associated with lower growth in
wages within employee categories. Second, they may be associated
with reductions in the employment shares of high-wage workers.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989a, 1989b) found that reductions in the
employment shares of high-wage workers (both central-office
personnel and nonproduction workers in production establishments)
tend to occur in connection with takeovers and leveraged buyouts
of manufacturing firms; it is plausible that these also occur in
connection with airline mergers. They also found that control






changes have no effect or a small positive effect on the wage rates
of production workers, but a large negative effect on the wage
rates of white-collar employees.
Surveying the remainder of the input price estimates, the only
other input price for which the within estimate of I' is even
marginally significant is the price of flight equipment. The
estimate implies that mergers are associated with 3.3 percent
reductions in the average price of flight equipment over-a five
year period.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the effect of mergers on
various aspects of airline performance during the period 1970-84,
using a panel data set constructed by Caves and his associates.
Previous papers have examined the impact of airline mergers on
fares and other determinants of traveler welfare, but we are not
aware of any previous evidence on their impact on airline operating
efficiency.
Our estimates, derived from a simple "matched pairs"
statistical model, indicate that these mergers were associated with
reductions in unit cost. The average annual rate of unit cost
growth of carriers undergoing merger was (a statistically
significant) 1.1 percentage points lower, during the five-year
period centered on the merger, than that of carriers not involved
in merger. Almost all (86 percent) of this cost reduction appears16
to have been passed on to consumers: the annual growth rate of
total revenue per unit of output was 1.0 percentage points lower
during this period for carriers involved in merger. This result
appears to be consistent with Morrison and Winston's finding that
(more recent) airline mergers have modestly increased traveler
welfare, when frequent-flier benefits are accounted for, as we
believe them to be in our estimates.
Part of the reduction in unit costs is attributable to‘merger-
related declines in input prices, particularly the price of labor:
the five-year growth in the average wage rate is significantly
lower among firms involved in mergers during those years than it
is among firms not involved. But an increase in total factor
productivity appears to be responsible for about two-thirds of the
unit cost reduction. The level of productivity of carriers
involved in merger was below-average prior to merger and above-
average subsequent to merger. These findings are consistent with,
albeit far less statistically significant than, Lichtenberg and
Siegel's estimates concerning the effects of takeovers and
leveraged buyouts on manufacturing plant productivity. Our
estimates also suggest that increased capacity utilization (load
factor) contributes to the productivity improvement associated with
mergers.
Our findings are consistent with the hypotheses that the
mergers that occurred during our sample period increased
productivity and capacity utilization, and that they reduced unit
costs, average revenue, and the average wage. Of course, one would17
not expect our parameter estimates to be unbiased estimates of the
effects of all proposed mergers. As documented by Morrison and
Winston, 5 out of the 9 mergers proposed during the years 1979-82
were either rejected by the Civil Aeronautics Board (one proposed
merger), or not consummated (4 proposed mergers). Presumably the
efficiency gains and price reductions that would have resulted from
these mergers would have been smaller in magnitude than (perhaps
even opposite in sign from) the corresponding effects‘.of, the
mergers that were completed. It is also not clear whether U.S.
airline mergers since 1984 (of which there have been many), or
mergers in other countries, have had effects similar to those we
have estimated. Further research is required to address these
issues.18
FIGURE 1
POTENTIAL CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE OF MERGER ON OUTPUT PRICE
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